Electronic voting has become one of the most popular activities over the Internet. Security and privacy are always regarded as crucial factors in electronic voting system design. Various secure voting schemes have been proposed in the past several years to ensure the safe operation of electronic voting and most of them have focused on the common "one man, one vote" plurality voting. In this paper, we study on the security and privacy issues in the Clarke tax voting protocol, another important social choice protocol. This protocol is important in electronic voting, especially software agent based voting, because a voter's dominant strategy is truth-telling, and consequently the overhead for counterspeculation is minimized. For the very same reason, it is essential to achieve the security and the privacy protection of voters so that voters' preferences need not be made known to the public, should this protocol be practical and popular. In this paper, we first present several cryptographic building blocks, including ElGamal cryptosystem, player-resolved distributed ElGamal decryption, proof of knowledge of 1-of-k plaintext and player-resolved mix network. Then we propose a secure Clarke tax voting protocol making use of these techniques. In the proposed protocol, we achieve privacy protection, universal verifiability as well as other security requirements, such as secrecy, eligibility, completeness, etc. One important feature of the proposed protocol is that the full privacy protection of voters is guaranteed, which means that all information in voting are kept secret even in the presence of any collusion of participants involved in the voting. The only information known publicly is the final voting result, i.e., the winning candidate and the tax for each voter.
INTRODUCTION
Secure electronic voting systems are examples of advance cryptographic protocols that are needed for practical applications in real life. In general, a (secure) electronic voting scheme can be viewed as a protocol that allows a group of voters to cast their votes, while one or more authorities collect the votes, compute and publish the outcome. It is clear that electronic voting schemes should satisfy all security requirements and achieve at least the same security level as those of ordinary paper-based elections, while the fact that the digital communication method is used may raise new security problems.
There have been many studies reported on the field of secure electronic voting systems, most of which, however, have focused only the common "one man, one vote" plurality protocol. The Clarke tax voting protocol is one in which the dominant strategy is truth-telling when the voters' preferences are quasilinear [1, 25] Consequently, it is often a more preferred protocol in some scenarios of electronic voting, especially intelligent agent-based voting, as it is comparatively more efficient when counterspeculation is no longer necessary. In this paper, we address the security issues in the Clarke tax voting protocol, and propose a secure and private Clarke tax voting protocol for secure electronic voting.
The Clarke Tax Protocol
We illustrate the Clarke tax algorithm with the following simple example. Amy, Betty and Cindy are good friends. One evening they decide to have Chinese food for dinner. Amy likes the spicy Sichuan cuisine very much. Betty, on the other hand, wishes to try the famous Peking duck, though Sichuan food is acceptable for her. Finally, Cindy really wants to have a delicious Cantonese seafood dinner, as she does not like spicy food. However, in a Chinese meal dishes are always shared, so they always need to share the bill after the meal, and each pays the same amount of money regardless of how much one really eats. Therefore, these friends must find a fair way to determine which cuisine they should go for.
voters' loss incurred by the preference he declares. In other words, a voter's tax is related to how much its vote has lowered the others' utilities, and voters that do not end up changing the outcome do not pay any tax. It is proved that the dominant strategy for a voter in a Clarke tax protocol is to declare his true preference [5] . Figure 1 shows an example of Clarke tax voting. Each row of the table shows a voter's preference. First, all voters Amy, Betty and Cindy declare their preferences for Sichuan (S), Peking (P) and Cantonese (C) food. According the declared preferences, they should go for the Cantonese food, as the sum of value is 21, which is the maximum among three possible options.
It can be observed that if Cindy had not cast her vote, the result would have been Sichuan food (S).
Therefore, Cindy's participating in voting effectively brings other voter's total value from 18 to 6. Therefore, Cindy is levied a tax of 12. On the other hand, Amy and Betty do not need to pay any tax. 
Security Issues in the Clarke Tax Voting
Much research has been conducted on secure voting schemes and an extensive list of requirements for securing electronic voting is described in [3, 4] . In this paper, we will consider these security requirements in Clarke tax scheme, among which are privacy protection, universal verifiability, various forms of robustness as well as other requirements such as, secrecy, completeness, soundness, eligibility and so on.
It has been proved [5] that with Clarke tax scheme, revealing the true value of each outcome is the dominant strategy of a voter. Such information of true preference, however, is usually regarded as the personal privacy of the voters, which is often too sensitive to be made known to the public. Therefore, it is of high practical importance to achieve privacy protection in Clarke tax scheme should it be to become practical and popular. Besides the issues of secrecy, completeness, soundness, eligibility, etc., the two most important security requirements in Clarke tax system are privacy protection and universally verifiability.
Privacy protection means that all sensitive information (i.e., the voters' true values of each outcome, the sum for each outcome, and the sum for each outcome without voter i's participation) in the Clarke tax scheme should be kept secret, except that the final results, i.e. the final elected outcome and the tax for each voter.
Universally verifiability is another important requirement of the scheme. Due to the privacy protection requirements, only the final results of the Clarke tax scheme should be known publicly. Consequently, it is necessary to achieve that any participant can verify the correctness of the results and detect any incorrect behavior of other voters with only the publicly available information.
Organization
The paper is organized as follows. We review the related work in section 2 and present the main contributions of our work. In section 3, we present several useful cryptographic building blocks used in this paper. A secure Clarke tax voting scheme with full privacy protection is proposed in section 4. We perform an analysis on security and efficiency of the proposed scheme in section 5, followed by conclusions in Section 6.
RELATED WORK 2.1 Secure Electronic Voting Protocols
There has been extensive research proposing various schemes on the design of secure electronic voting in the literatures. However, most of them concentrate on the common "one man, one vote" plurality voting protocol. One of the earliest approaches is proposed by Fujioka [4] using blind signatures [6] and anonymous channels. In this scheme, a voter prepares a ballot in plaintext, and then performs an interactive protocol with an authority that verifies the validity of the vote, i.e., that the voter is eligible to vote and has not already cast his vote. During the interactive protocol, the authority issues a blind signature on the ballot, which means that the voter will obtain the authority's digital signature on the ballot, without revealing the ballot contents to the authority. Finally, all voters submit their signed ballots to another counting authority who will then check and count all valid ballots. Note that an anonymous channel (such channel can be implemented based on cryptography, using so-called mix network [7] ) should be employed here to preserve the privacy of voters.
Another approach to secure voting scheme is using verifiable secret sharing [8, 9] , in which there are several servers to count the votes, and voters interact with all servers to share verifiably secret votes among the servers [10, 11] . That is, each server gets a share of each voter's ballot, and these shares are constructed with respect to a threshold t such that all the servers together can cooperate to obtain complete information on each ballot, while any subset of at most t servers has no information at all. The voter must convince all servers that the shares are correctly constructed and thus he is prevented from voting multiple times or voting incorrectly. After all votes have been cast, all servers then jointly compute the result of the election without leaking any sensitive information.
Homomorphic encryption based secure voting schemes [4, 12, 13] are proposed and discussed most recently, in which a voter can simply publishes an particular encryption of vote using a specific public key cryptosystem with a homomorphism property, say, ElGamal encryption [14] . In such schemes, a public key known to everyone can be used for encryption of the vote. When submitting an encrypted vote, a voter not only has to identify himself to be eligible to vote, but also has to prove the correctness of the construction of his vote, i.e., the encryption contains a valid vote. The privacy of voters is protected, since all individual votes are encrypted and the proof is zero-knowledge [13] . Moreover, due to the homomorphism of the encryption system, the election result can be computed efficiently. Homomorphism here means that two encryption of, say, number a and b, can be combined to produce a new encryption of a b + . By using this method repeatedly, all votes can be "implicitly added" without any decryption of any encrypted vote. Finally, we obtain an encryption of the voting result that can be obtained after decryption. The point of the above scheme is that the private key needed has to be secretly shared among a set of authorities in a threshold method. That is, each authority will hold a share of the private key, and the shares have to be constructed with a threshold value t so that no information of the private key leaks, unless more than t authorities corrupt or are broken into by an attacker. In other words, if at least 1 t + authorities behave correctly, a decryption can be performed. This is also known as threshold decryption.
It is clear that most of the work reported in the literature on secure voting systems rely on threshold computation that is distributed among several authorities, out of which a fraction must be trustworthy. Assumptions on the trustworthiness of third parties or authorities are always made. In [10, 11] , all servers share the votes of voters and it is assumed that at least 1 t + servers will never collude to comprise the voters' privacy. In [4, 13] , the private key for encrypting the vote is held by either a trusted third party or is shared among a set of authorities. However, in the reality, it is not always feasible to require that voters should trust any third party or other voters. It is also possible that groups of voters are formed, members of which share their knowledge and act as teams to perform maliciously. We therefore argue that distributing the trust on several authorities dose not achieve the privacy protection completely, since we can never rule out the possibility that some, or even all, of these authorities collude. Furthermore, in all previous work, the number of votes received by each candidate is also made publicly known at the end of the voting. Since it is possible that any subset of voters collude to act as a team, it is therefore easy for all but one voter to conclude and figure out the other voter's preference.
Our Contributions
As far as we know, there is no literature addressing the security in Clarke tax voting scheme. The Clarke tax voting mechanism is an important social decision protocol in which the dominant strategy is truth telling. This is of particular significance to software agent based electronic voting schemes, because efficiency of voting is improved as the overhead of counter-speculating can be eliminated.
In this paper, in addition to the security requirements suggested by others in the previous work, we focus on security issues in the Clarke tax system and propose a secure and private Clarke tax voting scheme that achieves full privacy protection and universally verifiability. We introduce the new standard for privacy protection, named full privacy protection. That is, in the proposed secure and fully private Clarke tax scheme, no (semi-)trusted authorities are needed, and the possibility that voters collude is not precluded. To achieve such full privacy protection, we employ the play-resolved distributed ElGamal decryption and player-resolved mix network so that to distribute the trust and computation to the all voters themselves. In such way, no information concerning the votes is revealed unless all voters share their knowledge. We note that it is impossible for all voters to form a single coalition and act as a team, or else voting is not necessary at all.
In conclusion, our main contribution is a universally verifiable secure Clarke tax voting scheme, in which each voter holds a share of secret information and jointly compute the final voting result. The only information publicly known is the final chosen outcome and the tax for each voter, while other related information is always protected.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe several cryptographic building blocks used in the scheme, including ElGamal cryptosystem, play-resolved distributed ElGamal decryption, proof of knowledge of 1-of-k plaintext and player-resolved mix network.
ElGamal Cryptosystem
One of the basic tool in our scheme is the ElGamal cryptosystem [14] , which works over a group GF(P) where P is a big prime number.
Let g be a generator of GF(P), which is a publicly available system parameter. A private key is an arbitrarily selected integer The ElGamal cryptosystem has two important properties, namely the semantic security property and homomorphism. These two properties are useful in our scheme. The property of being semantically secure means that a player who only knows the public key can re-encrypt a ciphertext without knowing the private key. Suppose that 
Players-Resolved Distributed ElGamal Encryption
The ElGamal encryptions can be easily extended to a distributed version, which is useful in our proposed scheme, by using a distributed key generation protocol [15] . We call it the players-resolved distributed ElGamal encryption, since the private key is generated jointly by all players. . In our scheme, we propose a cryptographic primitive, named proof of knowledge of 1-of-k ElGamal plaintext, as follows. To prove the knowledge of 1-of-k ElGamal plaintext, a player who submits an ElGamal ciphertext has to prove that the submission is a valid encryption, and the plaintext m is one of the k possible plaintexts, without revealing which plaintext it is exactly. We give the proof as follows.
Proof of Knowledge of 1-of-k ElGamal Plaintext
Let E(m) be a submitted ElGamal ciphertext, that is,
where g and Y are the public key, α and m are kept secret. To prove the correctness of E(m), the player generates a proof data f (assume that
where
To perform the verification on the correctness of E(m), anyone can check that the equation
Players-Resolved Mix Network
Another key technique in our scheme is known as mix network, which is first introduced by Chaum [19] for privacy protection. Some studies have been done, in both implementation techniques, and applications for different purposes [20, 21, 22] . A mix network is multi-party protocol that involves several mix servers. The input to the mix network is a list of ciphertext items and the output is a new, permutated list of those ciphertext items such that there is one-to-one correspondence between the underlying plaintexts of input and output items. The security of a mix network is characterized by the infeasibility for an attacker to determine which output items correspond to which input items.
In this paper, we employ a mix network based on the ElGamal cipher, in which we do not assume the existence of mix servers; instead, we assign the permutation task to all participants. In such a way, the full privacy protection of correspondence between input and output is achieved, and this is what we call players-resolved mix network. In the following, we describe how this mix network works.
The input to the mix network consists of a list of ElGamal ciphertext
encrypted by a public key. The corresponding private key is shared by all participants. Then, each participant performs a random permutation on this input list in turn by re-encrypting every ciphertext and output them randomly. The final output then be a sequence ( 1 ) (
represents a random re-encryption of ( , ) i i α β , and () σ is a random permutation function on k elements. The key point in above mix network is that each player must prove the correctness of his random permutation without revealing the correspondence between input and output. This proof can be done in zero-knowledge manner, as follows.
Suppose that each player possesses a k-input mix permutation consisting of a series of publicly verifiable 2-input mix boxes in some architecture. To achieve the public verifiability of the k-input mix permutation, the players only need to prove the correctness of the 2-input mix boxes. Assume that two input ElGamal ciphertexts: 
SECURE CLARKE TAX SCHEME WITH FULL PRIVACY PROTECTION 4.1 An Overview of the Scheme
The proposed scheme can be considered to be a cryptographic model of secure multiparty computation, in which there are n voters, 1 2 , ,..., n V V V , and m possible outcomes ("candidates") 1 2 , ,..., m O O O . We also assume that there exists a public bulletin board for shared information. A voter has read-access to the whole board; while having write-access to only a designated area.
Instead of having to reveal the true value of each candidate as in the original Clarke tax protocol, in our scheme, each voter will need to submit a particular ciphertext of his preferences using the ElGamal system. The public key for encryption is a public parameter and the corresponding private key is shared among all voters in a distributed manner. The key idea of our approach is to distribute the trust and the computation on all voters themselves. In this way, we do not need any (semi-)trusted third party as in other secure voting schemes, in which any form of collusion among these trusted parties has to be assumed impossible. Therefore, we do not make any special trust assumption in the proposed scheme. That is, no voters need to trust any third party, and it is anticipated that some group(s) of voters might collude in some form.
The voting process can be outlined as follows. Before the voting starts, all voters first perform the distributed ElGamal key generation, as described in the previous section, to generate a public key for system. Suppose that voter i chooses i x and publishes mod are kept secret by each individual voter respectively. Therefore, the private key X cannot be retrieved unless with the cooperation of all voters, which is assumed to be impossible.
For ease of illustration, we suppose that there is a manager M to perform the collection of votes as well as some publicly verified calculations work. 1 Note that we need not assume any special trust on this manager M. When the voting starts, all voters cast the encrypted votes containing their preferences, and then jointly figure out the winning candidate and calculate the tax for each voter, while keeping all the sensitive information in secret. We assume that the voters' values should fall into a bounded range. For ease of presentation, throughout this paper we assume that 50 50
Voting Procedures
We are now ready to give a formal description of the voting procedures.
First, each voter i V generates a vector i B that consists of m particular encrypted values corresponding to m candidates respectively, and publishes them on the bulletin board, i.e.
1 M might also be responsible for verifying the eligibility of the voters' identities with their public key certificates issued a trusted Certificate Authority. The manager M will then collect all submissions and calculate the component-wise product of all voters' vectors to get the sum vector V as:
,..., (2 ) (2 ), where
is the sum of values of candidate k O .
Therefore, the vector V is a ciphertext of the vector of value sum each candidate receives.
To figure out the final winning candidate, the manager M has to find the largest one among The manager M now constructs and publishes 100 
All voters then work as a mix network as described in the previous section to perform a permutation with an input list 
To determine whether The correctness of this approach can be established by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 If there exists one plaintext "1" in the decryption list
0 1 100 ( ) ( ( ), ( ), , ( )) i n D C D C D C D C ⋅ ′ ′ ′ ′ = K , it is concluded that p q O O ≥ ;
if there is no plaintext "1" existing in the list
Proof Suppose the encrypted vector of each voter is:
Where [ 50, 50] 4 There are some restrictions that should be noted.
(1) The value of n should not be too large, so that the calculation of 100 1 n ⋅ + ciphertexts is feasible. 
As illustration before, to compare whether p
constructs 100 1 n ⋅ + ciphertexts
Here, , 0 100 
The ciphertext list 
Now, all voters perform the distributed ElGamal decryption on the , the value sum received by the candidate that receives the largest sum of values, without knowing either the exact value of the sum of points of each candidate, or the difference between those sums. Finally, the manager M publishes the winner and all the verification information on the bulletin board, so that anyone can check the correctness of the result. It is obvious that any one can verify the legitimacy of the winner.
Calculation of individual Tax
The calculation of the tax for each voter is similar the above procedures, as described in the following.
To calculate the tax for voter i V , the manager M first calculates the sum of values for each candidate without V i 's vote, by computing the component-wise product of all vectors product, except the V i 's vector, that is: 
, and requesting all voters to perform a further distributed ElGamal decryption on Y ′ , we can get 
ANALYSIS 5.1 Security Analysis

Privacy Protection and Public Verifiability
In the proposed secure Clarke tax scheme, only the final winning candidate 5 and the individual tax for each voter are published at the end of the voting, and other information, such as the voters' values of each candidate, the sum of the values of each candidate and difference between those sums are always kept secret. In such a way, we ensure the privacy protection of each voter in maximum degree.
In the protocol, each voter publishes his value for each candidate in a particular ElGamal encrypted vector form using a public key Y, instead of in plaintext. Without the knowledge of the corresponding private key X, nobody can get the values of voters without breaking the ElGamal cryptosystem, which is assumed to be infeasible. Making use of the homomorphic property of ElGamal encryption, we get the encrypted vector of the sum of the each candidate's values. By employing the player-resolved mix and match protocol, we perform the comparison among the encrypted sum value, without leaking any further information. Since the basic building blocks of encryption scheme, mix scheme and mix and match protocol are proved to be secure [14, 23, 24] , it is easily to deduce that our scheme is secure against any passive attack.
Since the all related information is in ciphertext form, it is possible that any voter or the manager M perform maliciously to disturb the voting. For example, a voter may submit wrong encrypted values for some candidates or make an incorrect re-encryption during the mix work. In the proposed scheme, however, such active attacks can be easily resisted since we employ the zero-knowledge proof mechanism. For example, when publishing the encrypted values vector, a voter has to also publish a proof of knowledge of 1-of-k ElGamal plaintext, and during the mix network, voters have to prove the correctness of the output of each mix work by giving the proof of the correctness of 1-of-k ElGamal re-encryption and Plaintext Equivalence Proof. In such way, any participator can verify the correctness of each step of the scheme, and malicious voters will be detected immediately without additional communication and information revelation. Thus, the public verifiability (robustness) of the scheme is achieved.
Collusion-Proof
Another important security feature of our scheme is that we achieve the full privacy protection of the voters. That is, we do not assume the existence of any kind of trusted parties. Moreover, no collusion of voters can possibly lead to the revelation of any private information, unless all voters together form a single collusion, which is assumed impossible, otherwise voting is not necessary at all. While employing the mix network, we use a similar idea. That is, we do not suggest the existence of any mix server and the mix permutation is instead performed by all voters one by one. In such way, even (n -1) voters collude, they still cannot decide the correspondence between the input ciphertexts and the output re-encrypted ciphertexts.
Efficiency Analysis
We discuss the communication efficiency and the computation efficiency of the proposed scheme in this section. Table 1 gives the communication complexity of the proposed scheme when there are n voters and m candidates, with the value distribution being [-50, 50] . It is shown that our protocol has low round communication complexity (only one round) in voting procedure, and approximate m -1 rounds for determining the winning candidate and calculation of the individual tax. It is clear that most communication complexity is due to the fact that it is player-resolved, which is used for full privacy protection purpose.
Tables 2 shows the computational complexity of the proposed scheme. It is clear that the computational complexity of the scheme is approximately determined by m, n and the value distribution, so our schemes has heavy cost implication in case of a large number of voters and candidates or a wide range of value distribution. Therefore, a reasonable restriction of m and n and value distribution should be applied for an efficient implementation of our scheme. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the security issues in Clarke tax protocol and propose a secure electronic Clarke tax voting scheme that achieves full privacy protection of the voters and universal verifiability, as well as other suggested security properties. We propose the conception of full privacy protection, i.e. all information in Clarke tax voting system are concealed during and after the voting, except the final result of who is the winning candidate and the tax for each voter. No one can compromise the voters' privacy without the cooperation of all voters. This requirement is stronger and more realistic than those achieved by cryptographic electronic voting systems found in the literature. Our scheme also satisfies the universal verifiability criterion, which means that any participant can publicly verify the correctness of both the each step in the voting procedure and the final voting results. 
